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INTER PARTES REVIEW AS A SHIELD FOR 
TECHNOLOGY PURCHASERS: A RESPONSE 
TO GAIA BERNSTEIN’S THE RISE OF THE 
END-USER IN PATENT LITIGATION 
BRIAN J. LOVE* 
Abstract: In her Article, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, Profes-
sor Bernstein makes the case for legislative and judicial action designed to pro-
tect technology users from abusive patent enforcement that exploits their rela-
tive lack of resources and technical knowledge. This Essay presents the findings 
of an empirical study designed to determine the extent to which this problem 
has been mitigated in recent months by inter partes review (“IPR”)—a reform 
signed into law more than three years ago but only now emerging as a powerful 
shield for those accused of patent infringement. My findings suggest that IPR 
has thus far proven to be a substantial benefit to downstream technology pur-
chasers and other relatively small entities faced with infringement claims. I find 
that tech purchasers and small businesses have both been nearly as successful as 
large manufacturers at instituting reviews, halting co-pending litigation, and ul-
timately winning on the merits of their petitions. In addition, I observe that 
some manufacturers have filed IPR petitions to challenge patents asserted in 
court against their customers. However, despite the potential benefits of pursu-
ing IPR, I find that technology purchasers appear to be substantially underrepre-
sented among IPR petitioners, likely due to the high cost involved. Accordingly, 
additional reform measures may still be advisable to assist those particularly 
vulnerable to abusive litigation tactics. 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no entity is more responsible for renewed interest in patent re-
form legislation than Innovatio IP Ventures.1 Its campaign to collect patent 
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 1 On February 5, 2015, Congressman Bob Goodlatte reintroduced the Innovation Act, a bill that 
passed in the U.S. House of Representatives in December 2013 but later died in the Senate in May 
2014. Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015); Kate Tummarello, Patent Reform Bill Dealt Fatal 
Blow in Senate, HILL (May 21, 2014), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/206793-leahy-takes-
patent-reform-off-committee-agenda, archived at http://perma.cc/BK4W-8MT7. If passed, the Inno-
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licensing fees from thousands of Wi-Fi-equipped coffee shops, hotels, restau-
rants, and other small technology users2 invited scrutiny from patent scholars3 
and, more importantly, angered politically-powerful constituents nationwide.4 
For the first time in memory, patent litigation became an issue outside major 
tech hubs and outside the tech industry itself, as businesses with no engineers 
on the payroll suddenly and quite unexpectedly found themselves knee-deep 
in patent law.5 
                                                                                                                           
vation Act would, among other reforms, raise pleading requirements for patent infringement claims, 
establish a presumption that attorneys’ fees be awarded in patent suits, and limit discovery in patent 
suits prior to claim construction. H.R. 9. In 2013 and 2014, many other bills were introduced, includ-
ing a number at the state level. See Joe Mullin, Ten States Pass Anti-Patent-Troll Laws, with More to 
Come, ARS TECHNICA (May 15, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/fight-against-
patent-trolls-flags-in-the-senate-but-states-push-ahead/, archived at http://perma.cc/9V2A-KCX2 
(collecting citations to state-level legislative action); Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent 
Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-
guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-reform-legislation/, archived at http://perma.cc/JL4C-WLR4 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2015) (collecting citations to federal patent reform bills). As a counterpoint to the 
Innovation Act and other bills that target abusive patent assertion, Senator Christopher Coons intro-
duced the STRONG Patents Act—a bill largely comprised of patentee-friendly reforms—on March 
3, 2015. Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth Patents Act, S. 632, 114th 
Cong. (2015); Gene Quinn, Pro-Patentee Patent Reform, the STRONG Patents Act Introduced in 
Senate, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/03/03/strong-patents-act-
introduced-in-senate/id=55384, archived at http://perma.cc/YE6Y-DASE (referring to the STRONG 
Act as “clearly and overwhelmingly favorable to innovators and patent owners” and “stand[ing] in 
stark contrast with the Innovation Act”). 
 2 See Amended Complaint at 19, Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-
09308 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2012) (“Innovatio has sent more than 8,000 threatening letters to licensing 
targets [end users of Wi-Fi technology] in all 50 states.”). 
 3 See, e.g., COLLEEN CHIEN, PATENT ASSERTION AND STARTUP INNOVATION 12–15 (2013), 
available at http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Patent%20Assertion%20
and%20Startup%20Innovation_updated.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GBQ5-TEM8; Gaia Bern-
stein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1492–93 (2014); Col-
leen V. Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued en Masse for Patent 
Infringement & What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 235, 235–38 (2014); Brian J. Love 
& James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 
1606–08 (2013).  
 4 See Brian Fung, Patent Reform Advocates Are Launching a ‘Super-Coalition’ to Whack 
Patent Trolls, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
2015/01/15/patent-reform-advocates-are-launching-a-super-coalition-to-whack-patent-trolls/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/MCG7-REW8 (“‘When patent reform was being fought several years 
ago, it was tech versus pharma . . . . [But] this is no longer a tech-industry issue. It’s become 
much, much broader.’” (quoting John Potter, President, Application Developers’ Alliance)). 
 5 See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability 
in Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (concluding that patents are “almost 
never enforced” against private, noncommercial users of inventions). There have, however, been 
noteworthy exceptions. See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 
325, 325 (2012) (“[I]n the late 1800s, farmers were sued by ‘patent sharks’ en masse over their 
use of basic farming tools that were covered by scores of patents.”); Michael J. Meurer, Control-
ling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 
517 (2003) (noting that E-Data, a company that “owns a patent which arguably covers financial 
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In the years that followed Innovatio’s formation, other patent holders 
borrowed from the same playbook, demanding licensing fees from thousands 
of small business for using off-the-shelf technology designed and manufac-
tured by large tech companies that, presumably, these patentees preferred not 
to face in court. MPHJ Technology Investments—the “scanner troll”—
inundated the likes of doctors’ offices, architecture firms, and even non-
profits with vague licensing demands based on allegedly infringing use of 
ordinary copy machines, eventually drawing the wrath of the Federal Trade 
Commission and multiple state attorneys general.6 In addition, patentees like 
Lodsys, GeoTag, Soverain Software, and Clear with Computers targeted users 
of ubiquitous e-commerce technology,7 and yet another pair, ArrivalStar and 
PJC Logistics, sued local governments and trucking companies en masse for 
using GPS technology to track buses, trucks, and trains.8 
                                                                                                                           
transactions on the Internet,” reportedly sent demand letters to 75,000 alleged infringers before 
suing forty-one companies for patent infringement). 
 6 See, e.g., Complaint at 4, In re MPHJ Tech. Inv. LLC, F.T.C. Matter No. 142-3003 (F.T.C. 
Nov. 6, 2014) (alleging that MPHJ “sent [demand letters] to approximately 16,465 small businesses 
located in all fifty states and the District of Columbia”), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/141106mphjcmpt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8GN2-UHST; Ashby Jones, New 
York State Cracks Down on Patent Trolls, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2014, at B3, available at http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303819704579319071070777820, archived at https://perma.cc/
8CM2-CX6C?type=pdf (“[In addition to New York,] MPHJ has fought with other state attorneys 
general. Both Vermont and Nebraska have sued the firm, and last year, the company reached a set-
tlement with Minnesota in which the company agreed to stop its licensing efforts in the state.”). 
 7 Lodsys has sued more than one hundred alleged infringers in actions that generally settle for 
less than the cost of mounting a defense. See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, 
PATENTLYO (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-trolls.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4WGN-38JK; David Ruddock, Patent Trolls: What Is Lodsys Actually 
Asking App Developers to Pay? You Might Be Surprised, ANDROID POLICE (Nov. 2, 2011), http://
www.androidpolice.com/2011/11/02/patent-trolls-what-is-lodsys-actually-asking-app-developers-
to-pay-you-might-be-surprised, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZP3-QZ8J (reporting that Lodsys 
demands a royalty of only 0.575% of U.S. revenue even though royalty rates typically fall between 
one and four percent). GeoTag, Soverain, Clear with Computers, and others have sued hundreds of 
additional online retailers. See J.J. Barrow, GeoTag Searches for More Local Search Engines to Sue, 
PAT. EXAMINER (Feb. 29, 2012), http://patentexaminer.org/2012/02/geotag-searches-for-more-local-
search-engines-to-sue/, archived at http://perma.cc/7T88-WTVF (noting that GeoTag, Inc. has 
sued approximately 400 companies that use a “website with a business or ‘store locator’ search 
function,” including Giorgio Armani, Christian Dior, Oscar De La Renta, Gucci, Rolex, Nordstrom, 
Best Buy, Target, Yellow Book, Intelius and Yelp); Joe Mullin, How Newegg Crushed the “Shop-
ping Cart” Patent and Saved Online Retail, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 27, 2013), http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2013/01/how-newegg-crushed-the-shopping-cart-patent-and-saved-online-retail/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/RV78-UKX6 (discussing Soverain’s suits filed against Newegg, 
Nordstrom, Macy’s, Home Depot, Radio Shack, Kohl’s, Amazon, The Gap, Avon, Victoria’s 
Secret, Walgreen’s, and others for the basic use of the “shopping cart” feature on their websites); 
John S. Pratt & Bonnie M. Grant, Beware the Trolls: Explorers or Buccaneers?, 207 PAT. 
WORLD, Nov. 2008, at 18 (reporting that, likewise, Clear with Computers once sued forty-seven 
defendants in a single suit for using ubiquitous e-commerce technology).  
 8 See, e.g., Emily Badger, Why Is a Patent Troll in Luxembourg Suing U.S. Public Transit 
Agencies?, ATLANTIC CITYLAB (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.theatlanticcities.com/technology/2012/
1078 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1075 
In her Article, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, Professor 
Bernstein discusses licensing campaigns like these and convincingly makes 
the case for legislative and judicial action—more frequent use of fee shifting 
is her top choice—to protect technology users from sharp patent litigation 
practices.9 This Essay doesn’t aim to change the reader’s mind on that front. 
In fact, I have written on similar topics myself.10 Instead, this Essay investi-
gates the possibility that in recent months this problem has already (though 
quietly) been substantially mitigated by another mechanism—one signed into 
law more than three years ago, but only now emerging as a powerful shield 
for those accused of patent infringement. 
In 2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act (“AIA”), the most 
significant piece of patent legislation since 1952, spurred at least in part by 
concern that patent rights were regularly being enforced in abusive ways.11 
Though many reforms included in the AIA were greeted by the patent com-
munity with a collective yawn,12 one reform has recently emerged as an un-
                                                                                                                           
04/why-patent-troll-luxemburg-suing-us-public-transit-agencies/1819/, archived at http://perma.
cc/64N3-CSTZ (reporting that ArrivalStar has “sued the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Au-
thority, the New York Metropolitan Transport Authority, Chicago’s Metra, the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey, and Seattle’s King County Metro Transit” as well as other “transit 
systems in Cleveland, Monterey, California, and Portland, Oregon”); Avery Vise, More Than 200 
Carriers Sued for Patent Infringement, COM. CARRIER J. (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.ccjdigital.
com/more-than-200-carriers-sued-for-patent-infringement/, archived at http://perma.cc/TT48-73NZ 
(reporting that PJC Logistics “has sued 211 trucking companies, private fleets and logistics pro-
viders,” many of whom were “Qualcomm customers”); see also Chien, supra note 7 (providing a 
more recent litigation tally and showing that PJC Logistics and ArrivalStar have collectively sued 
over six hundred parties in over 250 cases). 
 9 Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1452–58, 1488–93. 
 10 See generally Love & Yoon, supra note 3 (arguing that the “customer suit exception” 
should be expanded to make it easier for manufacturers to defend patent suits filed against their 
customers); Christian Helmers et al., Is There a Patent Troll Problem in the U.K.?, 24 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 509 (2014) (concluding that fee shifting may be a key reason 
for the relative lack of patent assertion by non-practicing entities in the U.K.). 
 11 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (2012)); see also Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 
82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (enacting “title 35 of 
the United States Code entitled Patents”). For more on the motivations behind passage of the AIA, 
particularly modifications to post-grant administrative review, see, for example, Protecting Small 
Businesses and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent Troll Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Judi-
ciary Comm., 113th Cong. 3–6, 8 (2013) (statement of Q. Todd Dickinson, Exec. Dir., Am. Intel-
lectual Property Law Ass’n), available at http://ipwatchdog.com/blog/dickinson-senate-testimony-
12-17-2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/95RL-RHDX (recounting the debate leading up to the 
AIA and referring to “the assertion of allegedly invalid or overbroad patents” as “the very abuse 
for which AIA post-grant procedures were created”). 
 12 See GARY R. MAZE & K. KALAN, THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT: MUCH ADO ABOUT VERY 
LITTLE 2, 8 (2011), available at http://www.bw-legal.com/news/nbin/20111006_whitepaper.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6A4S-QHQH. 
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expected exception: procedural modifications to post-grant patent challeng-
es.13 
Specifically, the America Invents Act replaced the Patent Office’s proce-
dures for so-called “inter partes reexamination” of issued patents with a mod-
ified and renamed regime of “inter partes review” (“IPR”).14 In doing so, 
Congress raised the bar for granting petitions to review issued patents, but at 
the same time, advantaged petitions that do pass muster by expediting the 
process and allowing the reviews to take place before the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board in the first instance, rather than on appeal.15 Following these 
modifications, interest in administrative patent challenges grew, slowly at 
first, before eventually erupting in a full-blown explosion of filings in 2014.16 
To date, in-depth commentary on this “new normal” in patent defense 
has been scarce and what exists has largely focused on overall statistics span-
ning all types of patents and parties. This Essay breaks down statistics on 
IPRs to examine the extent to which they have been a boon for all accused 
infringers, regardless of size and position on the supply chain. As the data 
reported below demonstrates, technology purchasers and small businesses (as 
well as those with reason to step in and protect them) are beginning to seek 
refuge at the patent office—much as Congress intended—and have done so 
with a fair amount of success. As Professor Bernstein aptly explains in her 
Article, there was good reason to be skeptical that this result would come to 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially Viable Patents 
Invalid?, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-death-
squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid, archived at http://perma.cc/23H5-YETX (“[N]o 
one could have predicted . . . how broadly and rapidly the new challenges to the patentability of 
issued U.S. patents would become the standard defense tactic in U.S. patent litigation in all areas 
of technology.”). 
 14 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 6, 125 Stat. at 299–305 (setting forth procedures for 
IPR). The AIA also established two new forms of administrative post-issue review—“post grant 
review” and “covered business method patent review”—but both procedures have more restrictive 
availability and, as a result, have not to date generated enough petitions to warrant empirical anal-
ysis. See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, http://home.docketnavigator.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/
K8J6-Y4JX (last visited Apr. 8, 2015) (reporting that as of February 1, 2015, there have been a 
total of seventy-seven petitions for CBM review and a total of four petitions for post grant re-
view). 
 15 See Justin A. Hendrix & Robert F. Shaffer, Post Grant Proceedings of the AIA Provide 
New Opportunities and Require Reconsideration of Old Patent Litigation Strategies FINNEGAN, 
HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT, & DUNNER LLP (June 15, 2012), http://www.finnegan.com/
resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=598696f7-7eba-4fcb-83b8-2369caa91dd3, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q9QJ-EAE8 (last visited Apr. 8, 2015) (describing the similarities and differences 
between IPR and inter partes reexamination). 
 16 Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 93–95 (2014), https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/inter-partes-review-
early-look-numbers, archived at http://perma.cc/3HYZ-8KDF. 
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fruition17—and, to be clear, the data reported below suggests that there is still 
room for improvement. Nonetheless, early returns on the impact of IPRs are 
now in, and what they show is encouraging. 
The Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the data I gathered 
and my classification methodology.18 Part II summaries my findings,19 and 
Part III briefly assesses what conclusions policymakers might draw from 
those findings.20 
I. STUDY DESIGN 
To study the extent to which IPR has thus far benefited technology pur-
chasers and other relatively small entities, I assembled a database of IPR peti-
tions and collected a variety of information about the parties and outcomes 
associated with each. In this Part, I explain what petitions I studied and what 
data I collected. 
For this study, I started with a previously-compiled database that in-
cludes data on outcomes and co-pending litigation, current as of September 
30, 2014, for all petitions for IPR filed on or before March 31, 2014.21 As 
described in greater detail in a prior Essay examining these petitions, this 
study window includes 979 total petitions,22 proceeding in parallel with a to-
tal of 249 unique patent suits involving the same parties,23 and resulting in a 
total of 823 decisions whether to grant—or “institute”—a petition24 and 160 
final decisions affirming, invalidating, or cancelling claims challenged in an 
instituted petition.25 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1473 (arguing that “end users are less likely to benefit from [the 
AIA’s post grant administrative review] procedures because they lack the technological know-
how, and are unlikely to be implicated in the patent conflict at the time periods when the patent 
can be most effectively challenged”). 
 18 See infra notes 21–29 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 30–48 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 49–61 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Love & Ambwani, supra note 16, at 99, tbl.3. Because institution decisions are general-
ly issued close to six months after petitions are filed, this study window includes the lion’s share 
of IPRs that received at least a preliminary ruling on their merits by the end of September 2014.  
 22 Id. at 96. To identify IPRs and access the docket for each, we used Docket Navigator. 
DOCKET NAVIGATOR, supra note 14.  
 23 Love & Ambwani, supra note 16, at 104, tbl.8. We determined whether co-pending litiga-
tion existed by searching Lex Machina for each challenged patent’s number. LEX MACHINA, https://
lexmachina.com, archived at http://perma.cc/NK64-A969 (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). We collected 
data on motions to stay by reviewing the docket sheet available on Lex Machina for each co-
pending suit. 
 24 Love & Ambwani, supra note 16, at 100, tbl.4; see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6, 
35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012) (setting “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with 
respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” as the standard for the institution of 
IPR). 
 25 Love & Ambwani, supra note 16, at 102, tbl.6. 
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Building on this database, I first classified each IPR’s petitioner as either 
a manufacturer or purchaser of the allegedly infringing technology.26 As 
shown below in Table 1, I include in this latter category all down-stream pur-
chasers of the accused technology, including component buyers who incorpo-
rate the infringing technology into larger products, distributors and retailers 
who disseminate those products to customers, and off-the-shelf purchasers 
who buy and use those products. 
   Table 1: Technology Purchasers 
Type of Purchaser No. of Petitions 
Component Vendee 34 
Retailer / Distributor 8 
End-User 21 
Next, I classified petitioners as either “small and medium-sized enter-
prises” (“SMEs”) or large enterprises.27 Though there is no one established 
definition for what constitutes an SME, I applied this term (as others studying 
patent litigation have) to all entities earning less than $100 million in annual 
revenue.28 Finally, for all petitions challenging a litigated patent, I examined 
court records to determine whether or not the petitioner had been sued.29 In 
addition, I checked to see whether any of the petitioner’s customers were 
among those accused of infringement in court. 
                                                                                                                           
 26 I made this determination by reviewing both the challenged patent and publicly-available 
information about the petitioner, including the petitioner’s website. When available, I also re-
viewed documents filed in litigation asserting the challenged patent, including the patentee’s 
pleadings. I excluded from both categories a small number of third-party entities that neither pur-
chase nor manufacture the accused technology. 
 27 I made this determination by reviewing publicly-available information about the petitioner, 
including financial disclosures and other materials prepared for investors, marketing materials and 
other information available on the petitioner’s website, and (when necessary) information collect-
ed by third-party providers like Bloomberg Business Week, Manta, and Hoovers. 
 28 Cf. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 387, 398 (2014) (reporting separate findings for “[f]irms making less than $100 million in reve-
nue”); Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 464–66 (2014) 
(reporting survey evidence linking the impact of patent litigation to firm size, as measured by reve-
nue); March 2014 Litigation Report, UNIFIED PAT., INC., http://unifiedpatents.com/march-2014-
report/?utm_source=Unified+Patents+Newsletter&utm_campaign=8298fafa3a-Spring_Newsletter4_
22_2014&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_5140119467-8298fafa3a-81845149, archived at http://
perma.cc/RA6D-88GP (last visited Apr. 8, 2015) (defining “SME” as “about $100 million or less in 
revenue per year worldwide”). I excluded from the category of SMEs third-party entities that neither 
use nor manufacture the accused technology, even if those entities appeared to earn less than $100 
million annually. 
 29 As in my prior study, I collected data on co-pending litigation by searching Lex Machina 
for each challenged patent’s number. LEX MACHINA, supra note 23. All litigation data reported 
infra, including stay rates, has been updated and is current as of January 1, 2015. 
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II. FINDINGS 
In this Part, I report the findings of my study.30 On the whole, what I 
find is encouraging. Though technology purchasers and SMEs constitute a 
relatively small percentage of those taking advantage of administrative re-
view proceedings, these parties are relatively successful in their efforts when 
they do file petitions. In addition, the data reveals that some manufacturers 
are also taking advantage of IPR to shield their customers from lawsuits and, 
to date, have been more successful doing so with IPRs than through the litiga-
tion process. 
A. Technology Purchasers as IPR Petitioners 
Looking first at those IPR petitions filed by technology purchasers, I 
find that resellers and users of allegedly infringing technology are responsible 
for a surprisingly small number of IPRs, but nonetheless have performed well 
in the IPRs that they have initiated. 
As shown below in Table 2, purchasers are responsible for less than sev-
en percent of the petitions in my database.31 Though comprehensive statistics 
on the share of patent suits filed against technology purchasers do not exist at 
present, purchasers appear to be substantially underrepresented among IPR 
petitioners relative to the share of patent assertions they defend in court. For 
comparison, I collected data for a random sample of 250 patent suits filed 
contemporaneously with the IPRs in my database. In that sample, a purchaser 
of the allegedly infringing technology was named as a defendant in over one-
third of suits—a share almost six times larger than the percentage of IPRs 
initiated by purchasers.32  
                                                                                                                           
 30 See infra notes 31–48 and accompanying text. 
 31 Technology purchasers were responsible for a near-identical percentage of the total number 
of unique patents challenged during the period covered by my database (6.2%, 47/764), as well as 
a very similar percentage of the total number of petitioners and co-petitioners across all IPRs in 
my database (6.9%, 70/1011). My tally of petitioners counts a parent company and its subsidiaries 
as one party. In addition, to test whether the percentage of IPRs filed by purchasers has changed in 
the last year, I categorized the petitioners in a random sample of 100 petitions filed between April 
1, 2014, and April 21, 2015. The percentages are virtually identical. In that sample, purchasers 
filed 6% (6/100) of petitions, comprised 7.2% (11/152) of all petitioners and co-petitioners, and 
challenged 6.2% (6/96) of unique patents. 
 32 I collected this data by searching Lex Machina for all patent suits filed between September 
16, 2012, and March 31, 2014 and coding the defendants in a random sample of suits. In this sam-
ple, purchasers were sued in 35.6% (89/250) of all suits, accounted for 34.5% (100/290) of all 
defendants, and were accused of infringing 31.6% (156/493) of all unique asserted patents. Con-
sider also that fifteen patentees specializing in suing purchasers alone filed almost six percent of 
all patent suits initiated in the U.S. between 2010 and mid-2013. Compare Chien & Reines, supra 
note 3, at 236 tbl.1, 256 app. A (reporting that between January 1, 2010, and June 2013, the 15 
most litigious non-practicing entities sued roughly 2214 customer defendants in 813 lawsuits), 
with Cases Filed by Year, LEX MACHINA, https://law.lexmachina.com/ (located behind paywall) 
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Whatever the reasons might be for some purchasers’ reluctance to pur-
sue IPR, my findings suggest that fear of failure shouldn’t be high on the list. 
Among those petitions in my database, purchasers have performed reasonably 
well, even relative to parties that actually design and produce the accused 
technologies. Petitions filed by purchasers have been instituted at rates virtu-
ally indistinguishable from institution rates achieved by technology manufac-
turers33—rates which have generally been regarded as extremely favorable to 
accused infringers.34 Moreover, technology purchasers have achieved a one 
hundred percent grant rate thus far in motions to stay patent suits co-pending 
instituted IPRs—a trend that hinders patentees’ ability to induce alleged in-
fringers to settle simply to avoid the high cost of discovery.35 
                                                                                                                           
(last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (reporting that there were roughly 14,764 total patent suits filed during 
this same time period). Moreover, in recent years almost half of all parties sued by non-practicing 
entities were “non-tech” companies operating in industries like retail, transportation, financial ser-
vices, and hospitality. Exposure by Industry, PAT. FREEDOM https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-
npes/industry/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y69D-BU2S (last updated July 14, 2014) (reporting that 
between 2005 and mid-2014 over 45% of all parties sued by non-practicing entities were compa-
nies operating outside the “high tech” sector in industries like retail, transportation, financial ser-
vices, and hospitality); see CHIEN, supra note 3, at 12–13 (reporting that surveyed venture capital-
ists indicated that about forty percent of patent suits filed by NPEs against startups targeted tech-
nology the startup purchased, rather than developed). 
 33 Two limitations of the results reported in this Essay bear mention. First, they do not control 
for the quality of patents asserted against purchasers and SMEs compared to the quality of patents 
asserted against manufacturers and large companies. Thus, it is possible, for example, that patent-
ees targeting purchasers and SMEs assert marginally weaker patents (i.e., patents more likely to be 
found invalid) because they anticipate facing a litigation opponent that is unlikely to mount a 
vigorous defense. If true, this would tend to inflate the success rates of purchasers and SMEs that 
do petition for IPR relative to other petitioners. Second, they do not control for the relative quality 
of the legal teams representing various subsets of petitioners and patentees. Thus, it is also possi-
ble, for example, that purchasers and SMEs hire lawyers, expert witnesses, and other legal ser-
vices providers who are marginally less skilled compared to those hired by larger entities with 
deeper pockets. If true, this would tend to deflate the relative success rates of purchasers and 
SMEs. Unfortunately, neither of these two potentially confounding effects is readily or reliably 
quantifiable.  
 34 See, Meaghan H. Kent et al., 10 Reasons Every Defendant in Patent Litigation Should Con-
sider Inter Partes Review, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/309504/Patent/10+
Reasons+Every+Defendant+in+Patent+Litigation+Should+Consider+Inter+Partes+Review, archived 
at http://perma.cc/7BT4-4DPU (last updated Apr. 16, 2015) (referring to the Patent Trial and Ap-
peal Board as “pro-petitioner”); Scott A. McKeown, Speed of PTAB Fuels Criticism of Initial 
Trial Results, PAT. POST-GRANT (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/recalibrating-
ptab-amendment-practice, archived at http://perma.cc/Z8EL-E5XL (“Critics of the Patent Trial & 
Appeal Board (PTAB) are out in force decrying the work of the PTAB as anti-patent. . . . Some 
consider the heavy number of claim cancellation decisions as evidence of a bias against patent-
ees.”). 
 35 Patent owners, especially those that do not sell products of their own and, thus, cannot be 
countersued for infringement, can impose asymmetrical litigation costs on their opponents. See 
Patent Assertion Entities: Informational Hearing Before the Cal. Assemb. Select Comm. on High 
Tech., 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. 3 (Cal. 2013) (statement of Brian J. Love, Assistant Professor of Law, 
Santa Clara University), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2347138, 
archived at https://perma.cc/2ANZ-EZMZ?type=pdf. As a result of this cost differential, patentees 
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That said, purchasers have less to cheer at the final decision stage. 
Though the small sample size makes it hard to draw strong conclusions, pur-
chasers do not appear to succeed as often as their manufacturing peers. Even 
so, almost sixty percent of purchasers that pushed an IPR all the way through 
to a final decision succeeded in eliminating all of the patentees’ instituted 
claims—a success rate well above that seen in previous incarnations of ad-
ministrative patent review.36 
  
                                                                                                                           
are often able to collect settlements that reflect the cost of defense in addition to the value of the 
patented invention and strength of the patentee’s claims. Id. 
 36 Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 1 (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2013.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/D5K5-22LU (reporting that only thirty-one percent of inter partes reexaminations 
ended in the cancellation of all claims). 
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Table 2: Purchasers vs. Manufacturers 
 Purchasers Mfrs.† All Petitioners 
All petitions  63 (6.4%) 891 (91.0%) 979 (100%) 
No. with institution decision 
on the merits± 
% instituted for at least 1 chal-
lenged claim 
48 
 
81.2% 
(39/48) 
761 
 
84.1% 
(640/761) 
823 
 
84.0% 
(691/823) 
    
Instituted IPRs 
% instituted for all challenged 
claims 
% of all challenged claims 
instituted 
 
Final Decisions 
% invalidating all instituted 
claims 
% of all instituted claims in-
validated 
 
Co-pending Litigation 
Stay rates in suits co-pending 
instituted IPRs (number of 
suits with ruled-upon motion) 
 
69.2% 
(27/39) 
88.1% 
(636/722) 
 
 
58.3% 
(7/12) 
44.9% 
(144/321) 
 
 
100% (9) 
 
74.4% 
(476/640) 
88.3% 
(8979/10,164) 
 
 
77.5%‡ 
(107/138) 
84.9%* 
(1598/1882) 
 
 
81.2% (154) 
 
* p < 0.01♦ 
 
74.0% 
(511/691) 
88.3% 
(9769/11,059) 
 
 
77.5% 
(124/160) 
79.6% 
(1801/2262) 
 
 
82.2% (163) 
† This group excludes twenty-five petitions filed by third-party entities—like RPX, Unified 
Patents, and Iron Dome—that neither use nor manufacture the accused technology. 
± This number excludes petitions that were not instituted because the petition was deemed 
untimely or duplicative, without reaching the merits of the petition. A party seeking IPR of a pa-
tent asserted against it in court must, by statute, file a petition within one year of being sued. 35 
USC § 315(b) (2012). If a party fails to seek IPR within that one-year window, its petition will be 
denied as untimely. The PTAB also may deny a petition without reaching its merits on the grounds 
that it is substantially duplicative of an earlier-filed petition. Id. § 325(d). 
‡ Due to the small sample size, this result is significant with just 83% confidence 
(p=0.1605) despite the large gap between the two sets. 
♦ Tables 2, 3, and 4 indicate when the differences in institution, invalidation, and stay rates 
between the compared subsets of petitioners are statistically significant with at least 90% confi-
dence. With the exception of tests of per-claim institution rates, all p-values reported were calcu-
lated using a two-tailed Fisher’s exact test, which is the preferred test when sample sizes are small 
and data is unequally distributed among contingencies. For per-claim institution rates, the number 
of observations is sufficiently large to use a chi-square test. Both the Fisher’s exact and chi-square 
tests calculate statistical significance under the assumption that all observations are independent. 
For a number of reasons, including that some IPRs challenge the same patent and that some patent 
claims are quite similar, this assumption is not completely accurate. Other near-significant results 
are noted in individual footnotes. 
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B. SMEs as IPR Petitioners 
Next, because many commentators argue that patent law should provide 
special protection to technology purchasers due to their relative lack of re-
sources and sophistication,37 I also collected data on IPRs filed by small busi-
nesses of all types to see what, if any, impact size might have on access to, 
and performance in, IPRs. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, my data suggests that smaller compa-
nies, as a group, have embraced IPR and, thus far, have held their own on the 
merits of their challenges. As shown below in Table 3, SMEs are responsible 
for about twenty-one percent of the petitions in my database,38 a share that 
appears to be below the percentage of patent suits filed against them during 
the same period, but not dramatically so. In the comparative sample of 250 
patent suits discussed supra, patentees accused SMEs of infringement in 
about thirty percent of cases.39  
Moreover, SMEs have performed about as well as their larger counter-
parts overall. Though SMEs have fared slightly worse at the institution stage, 
they have performed slightly better in final decisions—effects that roughly 
offset one another.40 
  
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1489 (“[T]here is an imbalance of power between the par-
ties. Many end users, such as patients or small businesses, are entities of limited resources.”); 
Chien & Reines, supra note 3, at 237 (“The burden for these suits falls disproportionately on small 
companies and too often results in nuisance settlements based on the high cost of defending a 
patent case, not the merits of the claim.”). 
38 SMEs were responsible for a similar percentage of the total number of unique patents chal-
lenged during the period covered by my database (25.9%, 198/764), as well as a similar percent-
age of the total number of petitioners and co-petitioners across all IPRs in my database (21.8%, 
220/1011). In addition, to test whether the percentage of IPRs filed by SMEs has changed in the 
last year, I categorized the petitioners in a random sample of 100 petitions filed between April 1, 
2014, and April 21, 2015. If anything, the percentage appears to have fallen over time. In that 
sample, SMEs filed 17% (17/100) of petitions, comprised 11.2% (17/152) of all petitioners and 
co-petitioners, and challenged 17.7% of unique patents (17/96). 
39 See supra note 32. In this sample, SMEs were sued in 29.6% (74/250) of all suits, account-
ed for 28.6% (83/290) of all defendants, and were accused of infringing 26.0% (128/493) of all 
unique asserted patents. Consider also that a recent study of all 2014 patent suits found that twen-
ty-four percent were filed against SMEs. 2014 Litigation Report, UNIFIED PAT., http://
unifiedpatents.com/2014patentlitigationreport/, archived at http://perma.cc/DN4R-HCBY (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
 40 For example, SMEs and larger business are both about equally likely to win across the 
board in an IPR—i.e., invalidate all claims challenged in the petition. See infra Table 3. 
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 Table 3: SMEs vs. Large Enterprises 
 SMEs† Large Enterprises All Petitioners 
All petitions  207 (21.1%) 761 (77.7%) 979 (100%) 
No. with institution deci-
sion on the merits 
% instituted for at least 1 
challenged claim 
185 
 
78.4% 
(145/185) 
632 
 
85.6%** 
(541/632) 
823 
 
84.0% 
(691/823) 
    
Instituted IPRs 
% instituted for all chal-
lenged claims 
% of all challenged claims 
instituted 
 
Final Decisions 
% invalidating all instituted 
claims 
% of all instituted claims 
invalidated 
 
Co-pending Litigation 
Stay rates in suits 
co-pending instituted 
IPRs (number of suits 
with ruled-upon motion) 
 
64.8% 
(94/145) 
85.4% 
(2304/2698) 
 
 
88.2% 
(30/34) 
97.8% 
(536/548) 
 
 
75.0% (52) 
 
76.5%* 
(414/541) 
89.4%* 
(7384/8261) 
 
 
74.6%± 
(94/126) 
73.8%* 
(1265/1714) 
 
 
85.6% (111) 
* p < 0.01 
** 0.1 > p > 0.01 
 
74.0% 
(511/691) 
88.3% 
(9769/11,059) 
 
 
77.5% 
(124/160) 
79.6% 
(1801/2262) 
 
 
82.2% (163) 
† This group excludes eleven petitions filed by small third-party entities that neither use nor 
manufacture the accused technology. 
± This result is significant with almost ninety percent confidence (p=0.1083). 
C. Manufacturers Protecting Customers via IPR 
Finally, because anyone—including parties that have not yet been 
sued—can file an IPR,41 entities that manufacture accused technology can use 
IPR as a mechanism for defending (and potentially preempting altogether) 
suits filed against their customers. To determine the extent to which this is 
taking place, I collected data on petitions filed by manufacturers whose cus-
tomers had previously been sued. 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012) (stating that an IPR may be filed by any “person who is not the 
owner of [the challenged] patent”). 
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As shown below in Table 4, more than fourteen percent of petitions in 
my database42 were filed by manufacturers with at least one customer facing 
a full-blown lawsuit asserting the challenged patent. Just one-quarter of these 
petitions, however, were filed by manufacturers who had not also been sued 
themselves—a fact that calls into question manufacturers’ willingness and 
ability to look after their customers’ interests, rather than simply their own, in 
the majority of these challenges.43 
  
                                                                                                                           
42 Manufacturer-petitioners with at least one sued customer were responsible for a similar 
percentage of the total number of unique patents challenged during the period covered by my 
database (15.1%, 115/764), as well as a similar percentage of the total number of petitioners and 
co-petitioners across all IPRs in my database (14.6%, 148/1011). In addition, to test whether the 
percentage of IPRs filed by this subset of petitioners has changed over time, I categorized the 
petitioners in a random sample of 100 petitions filed between April 1, 2014, and April 21, 2015. In 
that sample, manufacturer-petitioners with at least one sued customer filed 15% (15/100) of peti-
tions, comprised 15.1% (23/152) of all petitioners and co-petitioners, and challenged 14.6% 
(15/96) of unique patents. 
 43 Of 140 total petitions that fall in this category, thirty-five co-pend litigation that exclusively 
targets technology purchasers, without the manufacturer joined as a co-defendant. The remaining 
105 petitions all co-pend litigation in which the manufacturer was sued along with at least one 
customer. In my sample of more recently filed IPRs, six percent co-pend litigation that exclusively 
targets purchasers. 
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 Table 4: Manufacturers Protecting Purchasers 
 Mfrs.  
Defending 
Purchaser-
Only Lit. 
Mfrs.  
Defending 
Purchasers 
in Any Lit.† 
Other 
 Petitioners 
All  
Petitioners 
All petitions 35 (3.6%) 140 (14.3%) 839 (85.7%) 979 (100%) 
No. with institution 
 decision on the merits 
% instituted at least 1 
challenged claim 
26 
 
80.8% 
(21/26) 
115 
 
86.9% 
(100/115) 
708 
 
83.5% 
(591/708) 
823 
 
84.0% 
(691/823) 
 
Instituted IPRs 
% instituted for all  
challenged claims 
% of all challenged 
 claims instituted 
 
Final Decisions 
% invalidating all  
instituted claims 
% of all instituted  
claims invalidated 
 
Co-pending Litigation 
Stay rates in suits 
co-pending instituted 
IPRs (number of suits  
with ruled-upon motion) 
 
 
 
57% 
(12/21) 
83.1% 
(306/368) 
 
 
75% 
(3/4) 
95.5% 
(64/67) 
 
 
94.1%  
(51) 
 
 
68% 
(68/100) 
84.2% 
(1216/1444) 
 
 
58.8% 
(10/17) 
76.7% 
(161/210) 
 
 
82.6%  
(69±) 
 
 
 
74.9% 
(443/591) 
88.9%* 
(8553/9615) 
 
 
79.7%** 
(114/143) 
79.9% 
(1640/2052) 
 
 
85.6%  
(146) 
 
* p < 0.01 
**0.1 > p > 0.01 
 
 
74.0% 
(511/691) 
88.3% 
(9769/11,059) 
 
 
77.5% 
(124/160) 
79.6% 
(1801/2262) 
 
 
82.2%  
(163) 
† This group excludes four petitions that, though they challenge patents previously asserted 
against technology purchasers, were filed by non-manufacturing third-party entities, including the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, RPX, and Unified Patents. See infra note 59 and accompanying 
text (discussing these petitions and citing legislation that would prohibit them from being filed). 
± This tally includes eighteen suits in which a manufacturer-petitioner was sued along with 
one or more customers and fifty-one suits in which the only named defendants were customers of 
the manufacturer-petitioner. These fifty-one suits collectively relate to a total of just twelve peti-
tions for IPR filed by a manufacturer of the accused technology.  
Potential conflicts of interest aside, I find that manufacturers were large-
ly as successful in these petitions as they were in others, achieving only mar-
ginally lower per-claim rates of institution and invalidation. Perhaps more 
importantly, manufacturers were also relatively successful in leveraging the 
IPR process to halt litigation filed against their customers. More than four-
fifths of the time their customers moved for a stay pending review, that mo-
tion was granted. As a result, some manufacturers were able to completely 
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preempt litigation filed against their customers and, thus, effectively take the 
reins of defense, albeit in a limited administrative forum. 
Notably, in doing so, manufacturers not joined to suits targeting their 
customers were able to accomplish something with IPR that they have histor-
ically been unable to accomplish through litigation. Though manufacturers 
often file declaratory judgment actions when their customers are sued, in re-
cent decades manufacturers have generally not been able to convince courts 
to stay earlier-filed suits targeting customers so that the manufacturer can liti-
gate in their stead.44 
With IPR, manufacturers have thus far had much more luck stepping in-
to their customers’ shoes. For example, SAP America’s IPR challenging pa-
tent rights held by non-practicing entity Pi-Net International led to stays in 
several suits Pi-Net filed against car rental agencies using allegedly infringing 
software.45 Similarly, Oracle was able to leverage an IPR petition to help its 
customers—including Macys, Carnival Cruise Lines, and multiple car insur-
ance companies—halt a suit filed by patentee Click-to-Call Technologies.46 
In fact, an IPR filed jointly by Lexmark, Ricoh, and Xerox led to the preemp-
tion of several suits filed by the infamous MPHJ.47 Many others, including 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Love & Yoon, supra note 3, at 1614. 
Under the customer suit exception, courts can stay litigation filed against a customer 
until after the resolution of a later-filed declaratory judgment action initiated by the 
accused product’s manufacturer . . . . [Unfortunately,] the customer suit exception 
has long existed in a state of relative disuse. Since the 1960s, the doctrine has been 
raised in fewer than seventy cases, and has been applied in just nineteen. The Feder-
al Circuit has discussed the doctrine just five times in the last thirty years, and has 
affirmed its application only once. 
Id. If enacted, the Innovation Act would codify a much more customer-friendly version of this 
doctrine. Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 5 (2015). 
 45 See Minute Order Re: Stay Pending Inter partes Review at 3, Pi-Net Int’l, Inc. v. Enter. 
Holdings, Inc., No. 12-CV-3970-PSG (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2013) (staying an additional four suits, 
filed against Enterprise, U-Haul, Ace Rent A Car, and Payless); Order Granting Motion to Stay at 
1, Pi-Net Int’l, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., No. 12-CV-10012-PSG (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2013) (staying three 
suits filed against Hertz, Dollar Thrifty, and Avis Budget). 
 46 See Order at 4–5, Click-to-Call Technologies, LLC v. Oracle Corp., No. 12-CV-468-SS 
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2013) (staying the case as to all parties, including several customers); Order 
Granting Motion to Stay Case at 4, Click-to-Call Technologies, LLC v. Ingenio, Inc., No. 12-CV-
465-SS (W.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2013). 
 47 Stipulated Order for an Interim Stay at 3, MPHJ Tech. Invs. LLC v. Unum Grp., No. 1:14-
CV-00006-SLR (D. Del. Apr. 4, 2014) (stipulating a stay for cases against Coca-Cola, Dillards, 
Huhtamaki, and Unum); Order at 1, MPHJ Tech. Invs. LLC v. Unum Grp., No. 1:14-CV-00006-
SLR (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2014) (staying the case against Unum); Order at 1, MPHJ Tech. Invs. LLC 
v. The Coca-Cola Co., No. 1:14-CV-00003-SLR (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2014) (staying the case against 
Coca-Cola). 
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Cisco, IBM, and Nintendo, have also successfully used this strategy to shield 
their customers from suit.48 
III. ANALYSIS 
Overall, the data presented above suggests that the plight of small tech-
nology purchasers is not as dire today as it was just two years ago. Despite 
the obvious disadvantages purchasers have relative to parties that actually 
manufacture accused technology, users and resellers appear to be performing 
unexpectedly well in IPR. Moreover, this seems to be true even among the 
smallest fifth of petitioners, who, despite having fewer resources available for 
litigation, do appear to have the funds and sophistication necessary to fight 
infringement allegations in an administrative proceeding. 
Though this seems like a surprising finding, perhaps it shouldn’t be. Be-
cause IPRs focus exclusively on the validity of the challenged patent, pur-
chasers’ relative lack of knowledge about the accused technology—which is 
primarily relevant to the separate question of infringement—is less of a liabil-
ity. For the same reason, purchasers can also rely heavily on relatively cheap 
third-party prior art searchers, rather than relatively expensive expert witness-
es, to provide the firepower behind their defense.49 
Moreover, regardless of resources and sophistication, some purchasers 
that find themselves embroiled in a lawsuit will soon thereafter be (at least 
temporarily) shielded from litigation costs by stays granted pending IPRs 
lodged by their suppliers. Whether due to indemnification agreements, good 
business judgment, or something else entirely, some manufacturers are using 
IPR to protect their customers and, those that are, have done so with a good 
deal of success.50 
Again, although this finding may surprise some, it probably shouldn’t. 
Manufacturers have long attempted to accomplish these same goals through 
litigation and, moreover, have shown at least some willingness in the past to 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See, e.g., Order at 7, AIP Acquisition LLC v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:12-cv-01690-GMS (D. 
Del. Jan. 9, 2014) (staying six cases); Opinion & Order at 8, Intellect. Ventures II LLC v. Sun-
Trust Banks, Inc., 1:13-cv-02454-WSD (N.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 2014) (staying the case); Order at 1, 
Motion Games, LLC v. Nintendo Co., No. 6:12-cv-00878-JDL (E.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2014) (staying 
the case for customers Rent-A-Center and GameStop). 
 49 See Love & Yoon, supra note 3, at 1629–30 (explaining why technology purchasers must 
rely heavily on professional expert witnesses in traditional patent litigation). 
 50 Id. at 1613 (“Widespread use of indemnification agreements means that manufacturers 
often remain on the hook for their customers’ settlements. Manufacturers also legitimately fear 
losing goodwill with existing customers as well as business in the future if they fail to stand up for 
customers accused of infringement.”). 
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use far less petitioner-friendly administrative procedures, like ex parte re-
examination.51 
Despite the successes purchasers and small businesses have had to date, 
however, these statistics also leave good reason to believe that IPR is far from 
a silver bullet for abusive suits and, thus, far from a perfect substitute for oth-
er forms of legislative reform presently under consideration in Congress.52 Of 
the first 979 IPR petitions, purchasers filed less than seven percent—a per-
centage that appears to be well below the percentage of patent litigation in 
which purchasers are named defendants and much further below the share of 
all patent enforcement efforts, including demand letters, that target purchas-
ers.53 In addition, though the degree of underrepresentation is much smaller 
for SMEs—and for both groups is mitigated to some degree by petitions that 
manufacturers filed in response to suits targeting their customers54—the ratio 
of total IPRs filed by purchasers and SMEs to total patent suits filed against 
them is also well below one-to-one.55 Put simply, large numbers of purchasers 
and SMEs confronted with patent demands choose not to take advantage of 
IPR—a system specifically designed to provide the sort of inexpensive and 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Indeed, many of the patentees most notorious for suing end-users faced ex parte or inter 
partes reexaminations. See EFF Challenges Tracking-Services Patent Used to Threaten Cities 
Across the U.S., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-
challenges-tracking-services-patent-used-threaten-cities-across-us, archived at http://perma.cc/
5W4A-KLYK (discussing EFF’s petition for reexamination of an ArrivalStar patent used in de-
mands against California, Cleveland, and the Illinois Commuter Rail for the use of transit-tracking 
systems); Mike Isaac, Google Steps Up to Defend Android Developers from Patent Lawsuit, WIRED 
(Aug. 13, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/08/google-android-lodsys-patent/, archived at http://
perma.cc/24K4-DWYD (discussing Google’s petition for reexamination of two Lodsys patents, 
which was accompanied by Google’s statement that “‘[d]evelopers play a critical part in the An-
droid ecosystem and Google will continue to support them’” (quoting Kent Walker, Vice Presi-
dent, Google, Inc.)). 
 52 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the Innovation Act and other legisla-
tion). 
 53 See supra, notes 2, 5–8 and accompanying text (describing demand letter campaigns that 
collectively generated tens of thousands of letters directed to small businesses). 
54 As the data shown supra in Table 4 suggest, the degree of mitigation may well be small. 
Just thirty-five petitions were filed by manufacturers to challenge patents that were asserted 
against groups of their customers, but not against the manufacturers themselves. See supra note 
43. All other petitions discussed supra in Part II.C were filed in response to suits that name a peti-
tioning manufacturer as a defendant. See supra notes 41–50 and accompanying text. Overwhelm-
ingly, these suits additionally name just one or two strategically-selected customer co-defendants 
and, thus, appear to be primarily aimed at the manufacturer, rather than its customers. Even if this 
were not the case, it appears that purchasers would still be substantially underrepresented among 
IPR petitioners relative to the frequency with which they are accused of infringement in court. See 
supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
 55 In 2013 and 2014, there was roughly one IPR petition for every five patent lawsuits filed. 
See DOCKET NAVIGATOR, supra note 14 (reporting that there were 2204 petitions for IPR filed in 
2013 and 2014); LEX MACHINA, supra note 23 (reporting that there were 11,080 total patent suits 
filed in 2013 and 2014). 
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expedited adjudication that these parties desire—and instead opt for tradition-
al litigation or, more likely, quick settlement. 
While the reasons for this deficit are likely myriad, cost remains a likely 
culprit. Estimates of the costs of litigating an IPR to final decision generally 
exceed $250,000 and often reach half a million dollars—not far below the 
median cost to litigate a patent suit to a pre-trial settlement and an amount 
that clearly leaves ample room for unscrupulous patentees to force nuisance-
value settlements.56 In short, despite the benefits of IPR reflected in the find-
ings discussed above, for many SMEs and purchasers the cost to fight in-
fringement allegations remains prohibitively high. 
Accordingly, as Professor Bernstein argues, there does appear to be a 
place for additional litigation-focused patent reforms even in a post-IPR 
world. Moreover, short of adopting new reforms to further deter abusive suits, 
policymakers and courts could also consider minor tweaks to reduce and con-
trol the cost of administrative review. For one, the PTO could reduce the fil-
ing fees for IPR, which presently top $23,000 for a single instituted petition 
with no discount for small and micro entities.57 The PTAB can also help keep 
costs low by continuing to grant motions to amend sparingly,58 by taking a 
permissive view of challenges by third-party industry and public interest 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Compare Kent et al., supra note 34 (“[T]he [legal] fees to take a PTAB proceeding through 
completion generally range from $200,000–750,000”), with AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013, at 34–35 (2013) (reporting that the median cost to litigate 
a patent case to the end of discovery is $350,000 for cases with less than $1 million in potential dam-
ages, and $1 million for cases with between $1 million and $10 million in potential damages). Many 
patentees have been known to settle patent cases filed en masse for relatively small sums. See Grego-
ry Thomas, Innovatio’s Infringement Suit Rampage Expands to Corporate Hotels, PAT. EXAMINER 
(Sept. 30, 2011), http://patentexaminer.org/2011/09/innovatios-infringement-suit-rampage-expands-to-
corporate-hotels, archived at http://perma.cc/B7WV-EKKF (reporting that Innovatio demanded just a 
“few thousand dollars” to settle with small businesses to ensure that a legal defense strategy would 
not make sense); Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—for Using Scanners, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 
2, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-using-scanners, 
archived at http://perma.cc/JF9Z-RSXW (reporting that MPHJ requested $1000 per employee from 
small businesses across the country for the use of ‘distributed computer architecture’ patents used in 
off-the-shelf scanners). 
 57 Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/
ope/fee010114.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/M5R7-DQ4P (last updated Apr. 1, 2015) (listing a 
$9000 filing fee and a $14,000 “post-institution fee,” as well as $200 and $400 per claim “excess” 
claim fees at each respective stage). 
 58 To date, the PTAB has granted just two motions to amend. Andrew Williams, PTAB Up-
date—The Board Grants Its Second Motion to Amend (At Least in Part), PAT. DOCS (Jan. 8, 2015), 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/01/ptab-update-the-board-grants-its-second-motion-to-amend-at-
least-in-part.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HNM6-U445 (“For only the second time, the Patent 
Trial and Appeals Board . . . granted a motion to amend claims.”). The recently introduced STRONG 
Act would change this status quo by instructing the PTAB to generally allow claim amendments 
during the course of IPR. Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth Patents Act, 
S.632, 114th Cong. § 102 (2015) (providing that claim amendments should be allowed as long as 
they are “reasonable”).  
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groups that can efficiently pool the resources necessary to mount a chal-
lenge,59 and perhaps also by further simplifying its procedures60 or relying 
less than it currently does on expert declarations.61 Finally, district courts can 
assist as well, by continuing to stay suits proceeding in parallel with instituted 
IPRs with high frequency so that purchasers and SMEs can petition with con-
fidence that they won’t have to fund a meritorious IPR and a lawsuit at the 
same time. 
CONCLUSION 
Although my data suggests that there is room for improvement, IPR 
does appear to be a substantial benefit to technology purchasers and other 
small businesses that find themselves staring down the barrel of a patent suit. 
So far, smaller players have been relatively successful at instituting reviews, 
halting co-pending litigation, and ultimately winning on the merits of their 
petitions. Moreover, manufacturers have been getting in on the act as well, 
using IPR to shield customers that choose not to defend themselves. One se-
rious chink in IPR’s armor, however, is that many non-traditional defendants 
appear reluctant to use it, likely because they largely remain unable to afford 
                                                                                                                           
59 A small but growing number of IPRs have been filed by industry groups (like the Printing 
Industries of America), public interest organizations (like the Electronic Frontier Foundation), and 
membership-based patent risk management firms (like RPX and Unified Patents). See supra Ta-
bles 2, 4. By pooling resources ex ante, these groups also help mitigate the collective action prob-
lem that arises when multiple purchasers, rather than one manufacturer, is faced with infringement 
allegations. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: 
Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review 
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) (“[A] challenger bears the cost of litigation 
but its rivals . . . will capture almost all the benefits of successful challenge . . . .”). The Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, for example, was able to crowd-fund an IPR that successfully challenged patent 
rights asserted against numerous podcasters. See Joe Mullin, Infamous “Podcasting Patent” Knocked 
Out, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/10/infamous-pod
casting-patent-knocked-out-in-patent-office-challenge/, archived at http://perma.cc/725K-L4S3. If 
enacted, the STRONG Act would prohibit groups like these from filing petitions. S.632 (restrict-
ing IPR to only those parties that would otherwise have standing to sue in court). 
60 For example, one commenter has suggested that the PTO could adopt “an analogue to 
judgment on the pleadings” in PTAB challenges and, moreover, could increase competition in the 
legal market by dropping the requirement that challenges be filed only by attorneys who are regis-
tered patent prosecutors. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for its 
Money: Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 90 N.D. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 43–
44), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2572647, archived at https://
perma.cc/WC42-PVNK?type=pdf. The STRONG Act would, to the contrary, make PTAB chal-
lenges less efficient by requiring each challenge to be heard by two different three-judge panels, 
one at the institution stage and another at the trial stage. S.632 (“A member of the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board who participates in the decision to institute a post-grant review or an inter partes 
review of a patent shall be ineligible to hear the review.”). 
 61 PTAB decisions not to institute a petition commonly criticize the petitioner’s expert declara-
tion. See Matt Cutler, Conclusory Declaration Testimony Again Leads to Unsuccessful IPR Petition, 
HARNESSING PAT. OFF. LITIG. (Aug. 28, 2014), http://ipr-pgr.com/conclusory-declaration-testimony-
again-leads-to-unsuccessful-ipr-petition/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z29C-MC7Q. 
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it. Accordingly, additional patent reform may still be necessary to assist vul-
nerable parties. And, if IPR costs can be further reduced, the potential bene-
fits to purchasers and SMEs may well grow in kind. 
 
  
 
